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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
§ 75-3-104. Claims against decedent—Necessity of administration
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed
by the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After distribution a creditor
whose claim has not been barred may recover from the distributees as
provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a former personal representative
individually liable as provided in Section 75-3-1005. This section has no
application to a proceeding by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce
his right to his security except as to any deficiency judgment which might
be sought therein.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 (1993)
§ 75-3-107, Probate, testacy, and appointment proceedings—Ultimate time limitPresumption and order of intestacy
(1) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or
appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will
previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings
relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be
commenced more than three years after the decedent's death, except:
(a) If a previous proceeding was dismissed because of doubt about
the fact of the decedent's death, appropriate probate, appointment, or
testacy proceedings may be maintained at any time thereafter upon a
finding that the decedent's death occurred prior to the initiation of the
previous proceeding and the applicant or petitioner has not delayed
unduly in initiating the subsequent proceeding.
(b) Appropriate probate, appointment, or testacy proceedings may be
maintained in relation to the estate of an absent, disappeared, or missing
person for whose estate a conservator has been appointed, at any time
within three years after the conservator becomes able to establish the
death of the protected person.
(c) A proceeding to contest an informally probated will and to secure
appointment of the person with legal priority for appointment in the
event the contest is successful, may be commenced within the later of
twelve months from the informal probate or three years from the
decedent's death.
2

(2) The limitations provided in Subsection (1) do not apply to
proceedings to construe probated wills or determine heirs of an intestate. In
cases under Subsection (l)(a) or (b), the date on which a testacy or
appointment proceeding is properly commenced shall be deemed to be the
date of the decedent's death for purposes of other limitations provisions of
this title which relate to the date of death.
(3) If no will is probated within three years from death, the presumption
of intestacy is final and the court shall enter an order to that effect and
provide for the distribution of the decedent's property in accordance with
the laws of intestacy under Title 75, Chapter 2, Part 1, The court has
continuing jurisdiction to handle all matters necessary to distribute the
decedent's property, including jurisdiction to determine what property was
owned by the decedent at the time of death.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107 (1993)
§ 75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of
the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it,
whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred
earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless
presented within the earlier of the following dates:
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors
who are given actual notice, and where notice is published, within the
time provided in Subsection 75-3-801 (1) for all claims barred by
publication.
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's
domicile are also barred in this state.
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the
death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its
subdivisions, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent,
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis are
barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative
within three months after performance by the personal representative is
due; or
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or
the time specified in Subsection (l)(a).
3

(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien
upon property of the estate;
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to
establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for
which he is protected by liability insurance; or
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and
reimbursement for expenses advanced by the personal representative or
by the attorney or accountant for the personal representative of the
estate.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 (1993)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, William Berneau, claims injury from an accident that occurred on
September 23, 2003, which he alleges is the fault of the decedent, Cameron D. Martino.
The decedent died on December 12, 2003, from causes unrelated to the accident.
Plaintiff first filed a lawsuit naming Cameron D. Martino on September 14, 2007, in the
Fourth Judicial District Court. That lawsuit was eventually dismissed by that court for
failure to serve, under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(b). The plaintiff, then
knowing of the death and that no personal representative was appointed, filed his second
action on August 1, 2008. At that time the plaintiff named as defendants the decedent
Cameron D. Martino and "the estate o f the decedent. No type of probate matter was
ever pursued to name a personal representative for decedent. The defendant appeared
specially below and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs claims were
now barred by Sections 75-3-104 and 75-3-107 of the Utah Code. The trial court agreed
in a memorandum decision dated January 16, 2009, and filed January 21, 2009. The final
Order of Dismissal was signed by the trial court on January 17, 2009, and filed the next
day. The plaintiff has appealed from that order.

5

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. The plaintiff, William Berneau, and the decedent, Cameron D. Martino, were
involved in a minor rear-end accident on September 23, 2003. Complaint, Record at 2, f
10; police records, R. 39; Order of Dismissal, R. 118.
2. The decedent died on December 12, 2003, from causes unrelated to the accident.
Complaint, R. 2, % 4; Utah Certificate of Death, R. 48; and Order of Dismissal, R. 118.
3. The plaintiffs first complaint was filed on September 14, 2007, in the Fourth
Judicial District Court and named as the defendant Cameron D. Martino. Complaint, R. 2,
Tf 5; and a copy of the court docket for that case, FL. 50 to 51.
4. That action was dismissed for failure to serve on February 27, 2008 by the Fourth
Judicial District Court. See Complaint, R. 2, f 6, and docket, R. 51.
5. The plaintiff filed this action on August 1, 2008, more than three years after
decedent's death. Complaint, R. 1; Order of Dismissal, R. 118-119.
6. At that time, the plaintiff knew of the death of Cameron D. Martino and that no
representative had been appointed. See Complaint, R. 2, ^f 6 and 7.
7. No type of probate case has been pursued regarding the decedent, and there has
never been an Estate of Cameron D. Martino. See Complaint, R. 2, f 7; Order of
Dismissal, R. 118.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Uniform Probate Code provides several limitations on the time periods
during which a person making a claim against a deceased person must present or file their
claims. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 requires a personal representative to be
appointed before commencing or reviving a claim. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107, with
certain irrelevant exceptions, prohibits appointing a personal representative more than
three years after the death of the decedent. These two sections together create a statutory
bar to any claim against a decedent if no personal representative is appointed within three
years from the death of a decedent.
Other statutory sections of the code create additional limitations periods.
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 provides additional limitations if a personal
representative is appointed, and also provides exceptions to those limitations. However,
the exceptions of Section 75-3-803 apply only to the limitations found in 75-3-803, not
those found in Section 75-3-104 and 75-3-107. The plaintiff in this case, even after
learning about the death of the decedent, never attempted to comply with the requirement
to appoint a personal representative, and no personal representative was ever appointed.
Given this, the plaintiffs claims are barred by Section 75-3-107.
ARGUMENT
I. Utah law bars claims raised more than three years after death where no personal
representative has been appointed.
The Utah legislature long ago adopted the Utah Uniform Probate Code as Title 75
of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-1-101 and -102. There are numerous
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provisions of the probate code that provide a time limitation that may bar a plaintiffs
claims against a decedent. Two are relevant to this matter. The limitations found in Utah
Code Ann. §§ 75-3-104 and 75-3-107 will be discussed in this section. Together they
operate to bar the plaintiffs claim in the underlying action. The plaintiff argues an
exception exists in the form of Section 75-3-803, which he apparently argues creates a
special cause of action. This section of the brief will address the statutory bar found in
Sections 75-3-104 and 75-3-107. Section II will address the exception the plaintiff
claims pursuant to Section 75-3-803.
The Probate Code addresses the obvious difficulty of pursuing claims against a
deceased person by requiring that a personal representative must be appointed before
such claims are commenced or revived. This requirement is found in Part 3 of the Code,
Section 75-3-104, which states:
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed
by the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3...
This requirement to appoint a personal representative does not leave those who
have claims against a decedent without recourse, as they are interested parlies who may
petition the court to appoint the required personal representative. See e.g. Utah Code
Ann. § 75-3-301. However, claimants may not delay in filing claims against a decedent
as Part 3 of the Code also provides a statute of limitations of three years that limits the
time period in which these claims can be filed. This is found in Utah Code Ann. § 75-3107. The relevant portions of that statute are as follows:
8

(I) No informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or
appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will
previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings
relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be
commenced more than three years after the decedent's death...
(emphasis added). The statute goes on to list several exceptions, none of which are
applicable to this case. Together, sections 75-3-104 and 75-3-107 require that, in all
claims against a deceased person, a personal representative must be sought within three
years. If this is not done, no claim against the decedent may be "revived or commenced,"
what the title to Section 75-3-107 calls the "ultimate time limit" to file an action against a
decedent.
In this matter, the decedent died on December 12, 2003.

No type of filing

requesting a personal representative was filed by the plaintiff or any other person before
December 12, 2006, three years after his death. However, the plaintiff filed a prior
lawsuit in the name of the decedent on September 14, 2007, delaying until just before the
general statute of limitations, found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307, would have run.
There is no evidence the plaintiff attempted to serve this lawsuit and it was eventually
dismissed for failure to serve, pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff filed his second lawsuit on August 1, 2008. Even though the Complaint
references the death of the decedent and that no probate had been attempted, the plaintiff
did not seek appointment of a personal representative or attempt to comply with Section
75-3-104 in any way. As there was no attempt to comply with Utah Law, the plaintiffs
claims are barred by Section 75-3-803

9

A, Case law from other jurisdictions supports a bar to the plaintiffs claims.
A Utah Court has not examined these sections of the Probate Code. However,
case law from other jurisdiction that have adopted the same language from the Uniform
Probate Code are instructive. In the case of In re Estate of Kruzynski, 744 A.2d 1054
(Me. 2000), the Supreme Court of Maine construed nearly identical language in sections
of the Uniform Probate Code adopted by Maine In Kruzynski, Levine, who was fifteen
years old at the time, was injured in an automobile collision on August 20, 1992. The
tortfeasor, Kruzynski, died on October 3, 1993. Levine did not learn of the tortfeasor's
death for at least three years and later filed a petition to have herself appointed a personal
representative in order to pursue her claim. Id. at 1055, ^[ 2 to 3
The Maine statute which is comparable to Utah's Section 75-3-104 is Me, Rev.
Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-104. Aside from cross-references to other sections of the statutes,
the Maine statute text is identical to Utah's Section 75-3-104, and is as follows:
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his
successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a
personal representative. After the appointment and until distribution, all
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the estate are governed
by the procedure prescribed by this Article. After distribution a creditor
whose claim has not been barred may recover from the distributees as
provided in section 3-1004 or from a former personal representative
individually liable as provided in section 3-1005. This section has no
application to a proceeding by a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce
his right to his security except as to any deficiency judgment which might
be sought therein.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-104. The Maine statute which is comparable to Utah's
Section 75-3-107 is Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-108. The language relevant to both
Kruzynski and this case is also identical in this Maine Statute:
10

...no informal probate or appointment proceeding or formal testacy or
appointment proceeding, other than a proceeding to probate a will
previously probated at the testator's domicile and appointment proceedings
relating to an estate in which there has been a prior appointment, may be
commenced more than 3 years after the decedent's death...
Me. Rev. Stat, Ann. 18-A, § 3-108.1 Facing these statutes, the plaintiff in Kruzinski faced
the same bar as does the plaintiff in this case. See Kruzynski, supra, f 7.
In Kruzynski, Levine argued, as does plaintiff in this case, that Maine's version of
Section 75-3-803(d), Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-803(c), provided an exception which
would allow her to pursue her claim. Id. ^ 5. "[Levine] wants us to hold that, when there
is a personal injury claim against an estate and that claim is only for the amount of
liability insurance held by the decedent, there is no time limit for the appointment of the
personal representative." Id. The Maine Supreme Court rejected this claim, noting:
Neither section 3-803(a), limiting the time within which claims must be
presented, nor section 3-803(c)(2), the liability insurance exception, are
applicable in this case because their application would be premature.
Claims cannot be presented to an estate until there is a personal
representative. No personal representative was ever designated for
Kruzynski's estate.
Id., <[( 6 (emphasis added). The Maine Supreme Court therefore affirmed the trial court's
dismissal in Kruzynski. Id. If 10. Like the Court found in Kruzynski, in Utah claims
against a decedent cannot be revived or commenced until a personal representative is
appointed. Where no personal representative is appointed within the three year period
after the death, the claims are barred.
1

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18-A, § 3-108 is different from Utah's statute in two respects. First,
it provides the language from the Uniform Probate Code applies only to deaths after
January 1, 1981, with different language for deaths before that date, and second, Utah
added subsection 75-?-107(3). Neither difference is relevant for this analysis.
11

B. Commentary supports a bar to plaintiffs claims.
The commentary included in the Uniform Probate Code, and included in the Utah
Uniform Probate Code, also supports a statute of limitations that bars plaintiffs claim.
The commentary for Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 states as follows, 'This and sections of
Part 8, Article III, are designed to force creditors of decedents to assert their claims
against duly appointed personal representatives." Though Utah Code Ann, § 75-3-802 is
not at issue here, its commentary from the Uniform Code is instructive, "It [Section 802]
implies also that after the expiration of four months from death, the normal statute of
limitations may run and bar a claim even though the non-claim provisions of Section 3803 have not been triggered. Hence, the non-claim and limitation provisions of Section
3-803 are not mutually exclusive." That comment goes on to list various ways a claim
may be barred, which are not mutually exclusive.
The trial court below also cited the Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-3-107,
which states, in part,
All creditor's claims are barred after three years from death. See § 75-3803(1 )(b) [which now prescribes shorter periods after notice to creditors].
Because of this, and since any time would be seen as a "cloud" on the title
of heirs or devisees otherwise secure under § 75-3-101, the three-year
statute of limitations applies to bar appointment of a personal representative
after the basic period has passed...
R. 108.2 The key to these comments is that there are a number of statutory provisions
that act as statutes of limitation. They are not mutually exclusive, and any may bar the
claims of an untimely claimant. In this case, the three year limitations period of Utah's
2

This Editorial Board Comment is not found in the current comments to Section 107, but
is found in the 1993 printed version of that statute.
12

Section 75-3-107 bus the claim as neither the plaintiff nor anyone else petitioned to
appoint a personal representative for the decedent as Section 75-3-104 icqinies piim to
pursuing any claims.
II. Section 803(4)(B) ct«« mil n n i i u n i \\ cause of action,
A. No cause of action against a decedent alone is created by Section 803.
Much of the plaintil'l ;; brief argues that Utah Code Ann. 75-3-803(4)(b) creates a
method for him to pursue a claim without regard to the remaindt-;

M

!'* ^bate Code.

Section 75-3-803 generally deals with how creditors of an estate must present claims
when a personal representative has been appointed, and provides time limits when a
personal representative is appointed. The specific language the plaintiff looks to is in
paragraph four of this section, which states, "(4) Nothing in this section affects or
pre vents :...(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish
liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by
liability insurance

" Id.

Plaintiff particularly focuses on the word ;;or" to make the novel argument that the
"plain language" of this statute is that the legislature authorized Plaintiff to file a cl.um
against "the decedent" separately from the personal representative, and thereby avoid the
requirements that a personal representative be appointed

Brief of Appellants, 11, 12

(citing HUF v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, % 32, 203 P.3d 943.). When read in context, the
plain language is that the exception to the limitations set out in Section 75-3-803 applies
to those types of proceedings that must establish what the liability of the decedent or the
personal representative is, when that liability would be covered by insurance. It does not
B

create a new class of cases where the only defendant is a deceased person without a
representative. It also does not exempt the plaintiff from the requirement of Section 753-104 to seek to appoint a personal representative before pursing the claim.
B. Section 75-3-803 is not applicable.
Regardless of whether a separate action against a dead person is possible, Section
75-3-803(4) is not applicable to this case. By the plain meaning of its words, paragraph 4
applies only to the limitations provisions of section 75-3-803, "(4) Nothing in this section
affects or prevents..." (emphasis added). The Legislature could easily have written
"Nothing in this title" if it had wished Section 75-3-803 to exempt a plaintiff from all
statutes of limitations in the Probate Code. However, the legislature very clearly limited
the exceptions in paragraph 4 to those limitations periods set out in Section 75-3-803. As
was stated in the Kruzynski case, neither the general provisions of Section 75-3-803, nor
the exceptions in Section 75-3-803(4) are applicable "because their application would be
premature." See Kruzynski, supra p. 1056, f 6. Section 75-3-803 governs when claims
can be presented to a personal representative and when they will be barred under those
procedures. Where no representative is appointed and it is no longer possible to appoint a
representative, as is the result of filings that do not comply with Utah's Sections 75-3-104
and 75-3-107, Section 75-3-803 in its entirety never becomes applicable.
G A deceased person is not a proper party.
It is not possible to create a fiction that it is "the decedent" being sued and no
personal representative or other proper defendant is involved. Common sense would
indicate that a dead person cannot be a party to a lawsuit. Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of
14

Civil Procedure provides, "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest..." Utah has little case law about how and whether this applies to defendai its,
or the capacity for defendants to be sued. The closest case is Green v. Louder, 2001 UT
62, Iflf 41-45, 29 P.3d 638, in which I his court held a personal injury plaintiff could not
join the insurer as a real party defendant.
Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure clearly do not contemplate allowing a proceeding
to continue in the name of a deceased person alone, as Rule 25(a) requires the
substitution of a party within ninety days of when death is suggested upon the records.
Therefore, if this case were to proceed in the name of the decedent, a suggestion of death
would be appropriate. As 110 personal representative may now be appointed, Rule 25(a)
would then require dismissal of the action within 90 days. This procedure would be
nonsensical if Utah law allowed suits against a decedent alone.
D. Utah law does not allow a lawsuit a^aum tlh* hwtfea\nii \ insurer.
The plaintiff makes many references to the decedent's insurer, but avoids arguing
that he should be allowed to make a claim directly against the insurer. Instead, he argues
he should be allowed to make a claim in the decedent's name, but without "disturbing" or
otherwise involving the family of the decedent. See Brief of Appellant, at 14. However,
creating a fiction that the deceased person is a defendant \* ffh the capacity to be sued as
the named defendant is simply a de facto direct action against the insurer of a tortfeasor.
This is clearly contrary to the law of the State of Utah. "In Utah, a plaintiff must
direct his action against the actual tortfeasor, not the insurer " Campbell v. Stagg, 596
P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1979). "Utah adheres to the general rule, that in the absence of a
15

contractual provision or a statute or ordinance to the contrary, the absence of privity of
contract between the injured party and the tortfeasor's insurer bars a direct action by the
injured party against the insurer in automobile insurance cases." Davis County v. Jensen,
2003 UT App 444, TJ13, 83 P.3d 405 (citations, internal quotations and alterations
omitted); see also Davis County v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., 2008 UT App. 414,
f 7, 193 P.3d 669 (cert den. 90 P.3d 1041). Plaintiffs argument that he should proceed in
the name of the decedent to access insurance proceeds is little more than the creation of a
legal fiction in order to overturn this long-established case law.
Regardless, the plaintiff has not named any party that could be an appropriate
defendant within either a three or a four year statute of limitations. If Section 75-3-803 is
read to allow a claim against the insurer for the proceeds of the insurance policy, the
plaintiff has never attempted to name the insurer as a party. Neither in his first nor in his
second claim did he attempt to name the insurer as a party. The plaintiffs claims are
therefore time barred as to the insurer even under the general four-year statute of
limitations of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307.

Similarly, as the plaintiff has never

attempted to name anyone in the capacity of a personal representative, any attempt to do
so now would face a similar bar due to the general statute of limitations.
III.

It is plaintiff who bears the risk for not diligently pursing his claims.
Throughout the plaintiffs pleadings and brief, he emphasizes the decedent's

insurer, claims an "ongoing dialog" with the insurer, and claims other facts irrelevant to
the application of Sections 104, 107 and 803. See generally, Brief of Appellant, p. 7-8,
1HJ 6-12. Even though these allegations are made, the plaintiff never put into evidence
16

any correspondence or other evidence showing this "ongoing dialog" or other evidence to
support these allegations. The only documents offered and included in the record

v

are: copies of the police report and exchange forms, a copy of the certificate of death, and
a copy of the docket report oi I In prior case, eact1

f

, ' were attached to the

defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, R. 38-51. A single I tier,
dated February ? .(»»)83 was attached to the Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, R. 70. The only document attached In llic plaintiffs pleadings on the motion
was a copy of Section 75-3-803. R. 62 and 63.
The one bit of this alleged "ongoing dialog" that the trial court had before it to
consider is a follow-up letter noting the claim adjustor

•*

ounsel's paralegal

on October 4, 2007 and informed her she had learned of decedent's death. The letter also
informed counsel she was closing the file. Despite this prior telephonic notice and letter,
the plaintiff did nothing with regard to the pending case, and it was dismissed on
February 27, 2008 by Judge Claudia Laycock of the Fourth Judicial Court, pursuant to
Rule4(b). See R. 51.
The record establishes that plaintiff waited until September 17, 2007 to file his
first Complaint. Plaintiff chose to wait until nine days before the general statute of
limitations would have run to Jik In t Lnnt, No evidence was ever produced that the
decedent, his successors, or his insurer had any influence in this choice. The first lawsuit
was dismissed for failure to serve on February 27, 2008, five months and ten days after it

3

It appears that plaintiff cites this letter in his statement of facts as f 10, but instead cites
the date he supposedly received the letter, February 4, 2008.
17

was filed. This was three and a half months after plaintiff was notified by telephone of
the tortfeasor's death, and twenty-three days after receiving the February 1, 2008 letter.
There has been no evidence presented that the plaintiff ever attempted to have the first
suit served or took other action to preserve that case. Again, plaintiff chose this course of
action; there has been no evidence presented that the decedent, his successors, or his
insurer had any influence in this decision. Similarly, there is no information presented
that the plaintiff sought appointment of a personal representative or otherwise attempted
to comply with the requirements of the law prior to the filing of this action on August 1,
2008. Even then, the plaintiff only sought to pursue a claim through a strained reading of
Section 75-3-803, ignoring all other requirements of the probate code. Again, plaintiff
made these choices. They were not made by the decedent, his successors, or his insurer.
Plaintiff made no claims in the trial court for equitable relief from any statute of
limitations or procedures, or any claims other than insisting a cause of action pursuant to
75-3-803 exists. He should not be able to raise such claims now, either explicitly or by
implication.
...[T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the
issue in the trial court. That is, a trial court must be offered an opportunity
to rule on an issue. A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following
three requirements are met: (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;
(2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal
quotations omitted), see also Hart v. Salt Lake County Cornm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997). The plaintiff did not sufficiently raise any issues outside of Section 75-318

803 pursuant to this standard. Given this, he should not raise alleged facts and inferences
related to other issues, not relevant to the issues on appeal, which are 1ti hunt ami
exceptions set forth in Section 75-3-104, 75-3-107, and 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform
Probate Code. To raise other facts and allegations in the appeal without providing
evidence of them in the trial court below prevents the appellee from responding with
legal arguments and *; porting evidence, and denies the trial court the opportunity to rule
upon them.
The relevant facts that were presented and ruled upon by the trial court, were
included in the Order of Dismissal, "this matter arises from an accident that occurred on
September 23, 2003; the driver who would have been the pnpt i defendant, Cameron
Martino died on December 3, 2003; no probate or other proceeding to appoint a personal
representative was ever filed: and this matter was not filed until more than three years
after the death of Cameron Martino." It is these facts that must he applied to Sections 753-104 and 75-3-107, which support the trial court's dismissal below.
CONCLUSION
The law adopted by the Utah State legislature provides for an \ -

^

^

in which claims against a decedent may no longer be pursued. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3104 requires a personal representative to be appointed before a lawsuit may be "revived
or commenced." Section 75-3-107 provides a bar against all such actions not filed three
years from decedent's death, as was recognized by the Maine Supreme Court in
Kruzynski, supra. As no personal representative was appointed. Section 75-3-803 is not
applicable. Even if it were, the exception is limited by the wording of section 75-3-803
19

to only the limitations provisions set forth in Section 75-3-803. Therefore, this Court
should uphold the order of the trial court below, and find that the plaintiffs claims in this
matter are barred.

DATED this

IQ^

day of June, 2009.
Victoria K. Kidman & Associates

)lom
Tajha L. Ferrara
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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ADDENDUM
1. Memorandum Decision, R. 102-110
2. Order of Dismissal, R 118-120
3. Complaint, R. 1-4
4. Certificate of Death, R. 48
5. February 1, 2008 Letter, R. 70
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I hereby certify that on this
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day of June, 2009, the foregoing Bi

>f

Appellee was mailed for filing with the Third Judicial District Court below at the address
below and that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was delievered by first class mail,
postage prepaid, to each of the following additional parties:

Clerk of the Court
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
P.O. Box 1860
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Mark T. Flickinger
Brett R. Boulton
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C.
3000 N. University Ave., #300
Provo, Utah 84604
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M 2 3 Z0C9
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

.ftnt t D
JAN 2 1 2009

WILLIAM BERNEAU,

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDl^^^<^PARTMENT
vs.

Case No. 080915531
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.

CAMERON D. MARTINO, AKA DAVID
M. CAMERON; AND THE ESTATE OF
CAMERON D. MARTINO AKA DAVID M.
CAMERON,

January 16, 2009

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.
The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions on
January 9, 2009.

Following the hearing, the matters were taken

under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions and memoranda and
for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling.
Specifically, this matter presents itself the result of an
automobile accident occurring on September 23, 2003.
With the motion to dismiss, Defendant asserts the driver who
would have been the proper defendant, Cameron Martino, died from
causes unrelated to the accident on December 3, 2003.

No probate

or other proceeding to appoint a personal representative was ever

BERNEAU v. MARTINO

presented.
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This is critical, argues Defendant, as the Utah

statutes are explicit about the method to bring an action for
claimed damages against the estate of a decedent.

Indeed,

asserts Defendant, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 controls claims made
against a decedent or his successors and provides:
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the
estate of a decedent or his successors may be
revived or commenced before the appointment
of a personal representative. After the
appointment and until distribution, all
proceedings and actions to enforce a claim
against the estate are governed by the
procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3. After
distribution a creditor whose claim has not
been barred may recover from the distributees
as provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from a
former personal representative individually
liable as provided in Section 75-3-1005. This
section has no application to a proceeding by
a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce
his right to his security except as to any
deficiency judgment which might be sought
therein.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104.
Moreover, contends Defendant, the statute of limitations for
when such an action may be commenced is found in Utah Code Ann. §
75-3-107, which provides the following in relevant part:
(1) No informal probate or appointment
proceeding or formal testacy or appointment
proceeding, other than a proceeding to
probate a will previously probated at the
testator's domicile and appointment
proceedings relating to an estate in which
there has been a prior appointment, may be
commenced more than three years after the

BERNEAU v. MARTINO

Page 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

decedent's death. . ..
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107.
In the instant, argues Defendant, no probate or other
proceeding to appoint a personal representative was ever
presented.

Accordingly, asserts Defendant, the Utah statutes now

bar any proceeding to appoint a special administrator or personal
representative as well as any claims against the estate of the
decedent.

Consequently, contends Defendant, the Plaintiff's

claims fail as a matter of law.1
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing the limitations on
presentations of claims for creditors under the Utah Uniform
Probate Code explicitly allows proceedings to establish the

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss arguing Defendant
first asserted that a claim may not be made unless a personal
representative has been appointed and in the Reply, Defendant now
argues that the claim has abated. Because Defendant's reply
argument is new and not rebuttal, contends Plaintiff, such should
be stricken.
Defendant opposes the motion arguing he did not raise new
issues in his Reply. Indeed, asserts Defendant, his argument has
always been that (1) Section 75-3-104 prohibits a claim against a
decedent or his successors until a personal representative can be
appointed, and (2) Section 75-3-107 prohibits that from occurring
more than three years after the death.
While the wording may not be optimal, the Court is not
persuaded Defendant raised new issues with his Reply Memorandum.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike is, respectfully,
denied.

BERNEAU v. MARTINO
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liability of a decedent up to the limits of insurance protection
for this auto collision after one year following the death of
Defendant.

Specifically, asserts Plaintiff, "The running of any

statute of limitations measured from some other event than death
and advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspended
during the three months following the decedent's death but
resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to the
sections which follow."

Utah Code Ann, § 75-3-802.

In this

case, contends Plaintiff, his claim is for personal injuries
arising out of an automobile collision and not the Defendant's
death.

Therefore, argues Plaintiff, his claim is controlled by

the four year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2~307(3) and suit was timely filed within four years.
Indeed, asserts Plaintiff, in the sections that follow
Section 802, the time limits for presenting any and all claims
are, again, explicitly set forth under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803
which provides:
(1) All claims against a decedentfs estate
which arose before the death of the decedent,
including claims of the state and any
subdivision of it, whether due or to become
due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by
other statute of limitations, are barred
against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of
the decedent, unless presented within the
earlier of the following dates:

BERNEAU V. MARTINO
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(a) one year after the decedent's death;
or
(b) within the time provided by Subsection
75-3-801(2) for creditors who are given
actual notice, and where notice is published,
within the time provided in Subsection
75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by
publication.

(2) In all events, claims barred by the
nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile
are also barred in this state.
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate
which arise at or after the death of the
decedent, including claims of the state and
any of its subdivisions, whether due or to
become due, absolute or contingent,
liquidated or unliquidated, founded on
contract, tort, or other legal basis are
barred against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of
the decedent, unless presented as follows:

(a) a claim based on a contract with the
personal representative within three months
after performance by the personal
representative is due; or
(b) any other claim within the later of
three months after it arises, or the time
specified in Subsection (1)(a).
(4) Nothing in this section affects or
prevents:
(a) any proceeding to enforce any
mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property
of the estate;
(b) to the limits of the insurance
protection only, any proceeding to establish
liability of the decedent or the personal

BERNEAU v. MARTINO
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representative for which he is protected by
liability insurance; or
(c) collection of compensation for
services rendered and reimbursement for
expenses advanced by the personal
representative or by the attorney or
accountant for the personal representative of
the estate.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803 {Emphasis added).
This action arises from an accident which occurred more than
five years ago.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104 prohibits a claim

against a decedent or his successors until a personal
representative can be appointed.

In this instant, it is

undisputed no probate or other proceeding to appoint a personal
representative has ever been presented.

This said, Utah Code

Ann. § 75-3-107 prohibits the presentation of such an action from
occurring more than three years after the decedent's death.
While Plaintiff seems to imply that he is bringing this
action against the insurer (who is not a party) such an effort is
contrary to Utah law in the absence of a contractual provision,
statute or ordinance to the contrary.
Finally, while Plaintiff has argued § 75-3-803 should apply
as such sets forth the statute of limitations as to creditors,
which he claims he is, it is important to note that in the
Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-3-107 the following is
stated:

BERNEAU v. MARTINO
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All creditors1 claims are barred after three
years from death. See § 75-3-803 (1) (b) [which
now prescribes shorter periods after notice
to creditors]. Because of this, and since any
possibility that letters may be issued at any
time would be seen as a "cloud" on the title
of heirs or devisees otherwise secure under §
75-3-101, the three-year statute of
limitations applies to bar appointment of a
personal representative after the basic
period has passed. Section 83 of the Model
Probate Code barred probate and
administration after five years, and other
statutes imposing time limits on these
proceedings are cited at pp. 307-310 of Model
Probate Code. A qualification covers the
situation where a closed administration is
sought to be reopened to administer
after-discovered assets. See § 75-3-1008. If
there has been no probate or appointment
within three years, and if either exception
to § 75-3-102 applies, devisees under a
late-discovered will may use a will to
establish their title. But, they may not
secure probate of the will, nor may they
obtain appointment of a personal
representative. The same pattern applies to
heirs who, in a case where there has been no
administration discover assets after the
three-year period has run. Such persons will
not be able to protect purchasers with the
ease of those interested in an estate where a
personal representative has been appointed.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-107 (Emphasis added).
In sum, after reviewing the record in this matter, as well
as the relevant statutory and case law, the Court finds
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is well taken and grants the same.

BERNEAU V. MARTINO
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A
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 080915531 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD' NAME
Mail

Mail

Dated this 2\

day of

XCW)

MARK T FLICKINGER
Attorney PLA
3000 N UNIVERSITY AVE STE
300
PROVO, UT 84604
TODD A TURNBLOM
Attorney DEF
lil E BROADWAY STE 750
P 0 BOX 457000
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145
, 20C^ .

cJVi
Deputy Court Clerk
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COPV
Todd A. Turnblom, Bar #: 7331
Victoria K. Kidman & Associates
P.O. Box 457000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801)257-7200
Facsimile: (801)257-7215
Attorneys For Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM BERNEAU,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

v.
CASE NUMBER 080915531
CAMERON D. MARTINO, AKA
DAVID M. CAMERON; AND THE ESTATE
OF CAMERON D. MARTINO AKA
DAVID M. CAMERON,
Defendant.

JUDGE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of the putative estate and/or next of kin
of Cameron Martino, David Martino, to dismiss the current action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Oral arguments were heard on January 9. 2009, and the Court
issued its Memorandum Decision, which was filed on January 21, 2009, and which is
incorporated herein. Therefore, having fully considered the motion, the memoranda submitted
by the parties, the oral arguments, and the law, the Court now makes the following:
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The following facts are not in dispute and therefore the Court finds: this matter arises
from an accident that occurred on September 23, 2003; the driver who would have been the
proper defendant, Cameron Martino, died on December 3, 2003; no probate or other proceeding
to appoint a personal representative was ever filed; and this matter was not filed until more than

three years after the death of Cameron Martino. Therefore, the Court finds that Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-3-104 prohibits a claim against a decedent or his successors until a personal representative
is be appointed, and § 75-3-107 prohibits an action to appoint such a representative more than
three years from the decedent's death. The plaintiffs claims must therefore fail as a matter of
law. Therefore, the Court orders the above entitled matter to be dismissed.
DATED this

|~)

Day of

[vj?

2009.
BY THE COURT

^

k

Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form

Mark T. Flickenger
Brett R. Boulton
Counsel for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this

27th

day of January 2009 served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER OF DISMISSAL, by United States first class
mail, upon:
Mark T. Flickinger, Esq.
Brett R. Boulton, 10802
FLICKINGER & SUTTERFIELD
3000 North University Avenue, #300
Provo, UT 84604
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MARK T. FLJCKINGER (8180)
BRETT R. BOULTON (10802)
FlicWnger & Sutterfieid, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
300'Esquire Building
3000 N. University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
(80]) 370-0505
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

COMPLAINT

WILLIAM BERNEAU,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No.
CAMERON D. MARTTNO, aka
DAVID M. CAMERON; and THE ESTATE
OF CAMERON D. MARTINO aka
DAVID M. CAMERON,

©rosion

Defendants.
PARTIES. JURISDICTION. AND VENUE
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah.

2.

Defendant Cameron Dr Martino, aka David M. Cameron, ("Defendant Martino")

was a resident of Utah County, State of Utah.
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The acts upon which this Complaint is based occurred in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah.
4.

Defendant passed away December 3,2003, at the age of 22, in Utah County due
to

causes unrelated to this auto accident.
5.

Plaintiff timely filed his Coraplaint against Defendant in this matter on September

14,2007.
6.

Plaintiffs Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on February 27, 2008,

for failure to serve.
7.

No probate was executed with respect to Defendant's estate.

8.

Plaintiff brings the present action against the Estate of Cameron. D. Martino aka

David M. Cameron pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75~3-8Q3(4)(b).
9.

Pursuant to Article VU, §5 of the Utah Constitution and U . C J \ . § 7 8 « 3 - 4 ( 1) and

(3), this Court has jurisdiction over this case.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
10.

On or about September 23,2003, Plaintiff was traveling eastbound on 3300 South

and stopped at the intersection of 900 Bast in Salt Lake City, Utah.
U-

Defendant Martino was also traveling eastbound on 3300 South directly behind

plaintiff Berneau.
12.

As the light turned green and traffic proceeded forward, Defendant Martino

negligently failed to keep a proper lookout and collided with Plaintiffs vehicle, pushing bim
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forward into a third vehicle.
13.

As a proximate cause of Defendant Martino's negligence, Plaintiff suffered

personal injuries including but not limited to: two disc herniations causing severe spinal stenosis
at C3-4 and C4-5; stabbing shoulder pain; numbness and tingling inrighthand; chronic
headaches and bilateral radiculopathy in lower extremity, including pain and numbness in his
back.
14.

As a result thereof, Plaintiff has incurred, special damages for which he shall be

entitled to recover in an amount not yet fully ascertained but is at least $9,350.89.
15.

Plaintiff is entitled to recoverfromDefendants the special damages referred to

herein for medical expenses and for travel expenses incurred in driving to and from the various
medical providers.
16.

As a further direct and proximate result of the accident, Plaintiff has suffered pain

and suffering and a loss of enjoyment of life, significant emotional distress, and permanent
injury, for which general damages he is entitled to recoverfromDefendants in the proceeding.
17.

Plaintiff also may incur other additional medical expenses in connection with his

treatment for injuries suffered from this accident which he should recover from Defendant in this
proceeding.
18.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on all special damages as allowed by law, court

costs, and other relief as may be deemed proper in the premises.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against above Defendant for special
damages, general damages, interest on damages, court costs, and other relief as may be proper in
Page 3 of 4
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DATED this 3 / day of July, 200S.
FL1CKINGER & SUTTERFIEU), P.C

M^fkT.FlickingcT ^ ^
Brett R. Boulton
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs address:
512 North 150 East
Orem, UT 84057
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State Farm Insurance Cos.
P.O. Box 339408
Groeby Co 80633-9408
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D\ i ight Flickinger Attorney at, Law
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C
3000 N, Univ. Ave, Ste 3 00
Provo, UT 84604
RE:

Claim Number
Date of Lost
Our Insured
:
Your Reference:

14 3193-146
September 23, 2003
Cameron D Martino
William Berneau

Dear Mr, Dwight Flickinger:
j w a r i t d t o f o l l o w up with you regarding my telephone conversation
on October 4, 2007 with your paralegal. We have learned that our
insured driver, Cameron Martion, passed away i n 20 03 from,
complications following an illness.
As no valid claim has been presented against Mr. Martino, we are
closing our file. Dwight, I ask that if you choose to pursue
this claim any further that you call me, and then send to me a
copy of the same correspondence,
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,

Linda
Claim
(800)
State

Edwards
Representative
324-0704 ext, 25830
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
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